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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellees do not dispute this Court's jurisdiction. The Order transferring 
review of this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals is attached at Addendum A. 
R.963-65. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUEl 
Whether the trial court correctly granted Defendant's counter-motion for 
summary judgment, because the facts are undisputed any applicable statutes of 
limitations ran prior to the filing of this case in 2008, in favor of the 
Defendants/ Appellees Boyd J. Brown, Sentry Financial Corporation, and SFC 
Aircraft Corp t (hereafter collectively "Brown")? 
ISSUE 2 
Whether the trial court correctly determined and applied the statute of 
limitations? 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 11 An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal 
conclusion and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for 
correctness .... " Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ,r 6, 177 P.3d 600. In reviewing the 
grant or denial of summary judgment, appellate courts view "[t]he facts and all 
reasonable inferences ... in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." 
Higgins v. Salt Lake Cnty., 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). However, appellate 
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courts affirm Ii where, even according to the facts as contended by the losing 
party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Themy v. 
Seagull Enters., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 1979). 
The application of a statute of limitations is a question of law. See Arnold v. 
Grigsby,2009 UT 88, 17,225 P.3d 781. 
PRESERVATION 
Brown argued these issues before the trial court during the parties' cross-
motions for summary judgment. R. 264-65; 271-397; 913-15. See Order from 
Hearings on Motions for Summary Judgment at R.913-15, attached at Addendum 
B. The trial court gave further detail of the opinion granting summary judgment 
in its Ruling which denied Plaintiffs' Rules 59(b) and 60(b) Motions. R. 946-56. 
Denial of the Rules 59(b) and 60(b) Motions has not been appealed but because 
the Ruling addresses the facts and law of the summary judgment decision in 
part, this information is applicable to this Appeal, while the arguments and facts 
raised by the Plaintiffs for the first time are not. See Ruling at R.946-56; attached 
as AddendumC. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code § 78B-2-104, attached at Addendum D 
Utah Code § 78B-2-305, attached at Addendum E 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, attached at Addendum F 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is essentially a statute of limitations case arising from a breached loan 
agreement. The loan contract ("Letter Agreement") was entered into by 
Appellant Majestic Airline Inc. ("Majestic") and by Appellee SFC AircraftCorp I, 
an entity initially formed and held by Appellee Sentry Financial Corporation 
(collectively "Sentry"). See Letter Agreement at R.299-302, attached at 
Addendum G. Sentry's $483,102.43 loan to Majestic was personally guaranteed 
by two separate guaranty contracts, (1) between Appellant David Gillett 
("Gillett"), the sole shareholder of Majestic, and Sentry; and (2) between Boyd 
Brown, who was an acquaintance of Gillett, and Sentry. R.299-302. See Brown 
Guaranty and Waiver at 304-06, attached at Addendum H. 
After Majestic failed to make its first and multiple subsequent payments, 
Sentry demanded a partial guaranty payment by guarantor Brown in the amount 
of nearly $250,000, which was less than half of Majestic's then outstanding 
balance owed to Sentry. R.214-215; 308; 389; 395. Brown made the partial 
guaranty payment as required by his guaranty contract, and neither Brown nor 
Sentry notified Gillett/Majestic of Brown's partial guaranty payment, as Sentry's 
demand for Brown's partial guaranty payment was pursuant to a separate 
agreement between Sentry and Brown, to which Gillett was not a party. R.390-
3 
392; 304-306. Sentry subsequently initiated foreclosure proceedings against 
Majestic for Majestic' s outstanding obligation, and ultimately held an auction in 
October 1995 at which the Majestic collateral was sold along with personal 
property put up by guarantor Gillett, in order to recoup Majestic' s outstanding 
obligation to Sentry. R.352-353. Majestic' s outstanding obligation was not 
reduced by Brown's partial guaranty payment, and Sentry promptly reimbursed 
Brown his partial guaranty payment from the auction proceeds. R.359; 394. 
The Letter Agreement was signed more than twenty years ago, in April 
1994, and by 1995, Gillett/Majestic' s failure to perform their contracted 
obligations amounted to a breach of contract. R.299-302; 308; 913-915. In 2002, 
Gillett learned of Brown's partial guaranty payment of nearly $250,000 made 
pursuant to Brown's personal guaranty. R.182; 304-306. Approximately five years 
later, in 2007, Gillett/Majestic filed a Complaint against Brown, SFC 
AircraftCorp I and Sentry, alleging breach of contract by Brown and Sentry, and 
fraud by Boyd Brown. R.1-17; 913-915; 946-956. After the 2007 case was dismissed 
without prejudice, Gillett/Majestic filed the case at bar in 2008. R.1-17. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Gillett/Majestic' s Statement of Facts sets forth several pages of information 
that contain numerous legal conclusions and factual allegations not supported by 
the Record. The district court's Order from Hearing on Motions for Summary 
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Judgment (Addendum B at R.913-915) and its Ruling on Plaintiff's Rule 59 & 
Rule 60(b) Motions (Addendum Cat R.946-956) recite the material, undisputed 
facts upon which the court's legal conclusions are based; however, Gillett' s 
Statement of Facts include alleged facts that contradict the facts stated by the 
district court. Thus, a significant portion of the "facts" in the opening brief 
essentially amount to unsupported allegations pulled from Gillett' s own 
affidavits. Brown will not respond in kind, but instead will limit his statement of 
facts to those that are undisputed, supported by the Record, and relevant to the 
issues before the Court. 
Sentry's Loan to Majestic 
In 1994, Majestic Airlines Inc., a small airline company owned by David 
Gillett, was in default on a loan contract it had with Textron Financial 
Corporation in the amount of $454,021.99. R.299; 343. On April 29, 1994, Majestic 
~ entered into a contract with Sentry for a loan to Majestic in the amount of 
$483,102.43, which would be repaid to Sentry by Majestic. R.299. The purpose of 
the loan was to prevent the impending foreclosure of Majestic' s collateral assets 
by Textron Financial Corporation as a result of Majestic' s default on its loan with 
Textron. R.350; 370. 
Due to Gillett/Majestic's default on the Textron loan, Sentry would not 
originate a loan to Gillett/Majestic with Majestic' s assets as the only security for 
the loan. R.393. Accordingly, in addition to Majestic' s assets as security for the 
loan, Gillett personally guaranteed the loan to Majestic; Sentry additionally 
5 
required a personal guaranty of the loan by Boyd Brown. R.304-306; 344-345; 350. 
Brown was selected as a guarantor because of his personal relationships 
with both David Gillett and Jonathan Ruga, CEO of Sentry. R.344. Sentry and 
Majestic were signatory parties to a .,,Letter Agreement," the contract which 
outlines the terms of the loan from Sentry to Gillett/Majestic. R.299-302. David 
Gillett and Boyd Brown were both listed as personal guarantors of the loan in the 
"Letter Agreement." R.299-302. Consistent with his guaranty of the loan, on May 
23, 1994, Brown entered into a separate contract with Sentry for his guaranty of 
the $483,102.43 loan Sentry made to Majestic; Brown received $20,000 as 
consideration for his guaranty contract with Sentry. R.304-306. 
After entering the "Letter Agreement" with Sentry, Majestic failed to make 
its first several payments, including an approximately $30,000 interim payment it 
was required to make. R.308. In fact, from the time Gillett/Majestic entered the 
Letter Agreement to the time of Sentry's foreclosure of Majestic' s secured 
collateral, Majestic only made a total of three (3) payments in the amount of 
$15,779.57 each. R.308. A credit of approximately $8,000 against the loan balance 
was not actually paid by Majestic, but was applied to Majestic' s loan payments 
because Sentry had received a credit from Textron. R.308; 351-352. 
Sentry repeatedly attempted to contact Gillett regarding his/Majestic's 
multiple missed loan payments. R.350. Finally, as a result of Gillett/Majestic' s 
failure to perform the terms of the Letter Agreement with Sentry, Sentry initiated 
default proceedings. R.386. Pursuant to Brown's contract with Sentry for Brown's 
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personal guaranty of the loan, Sentry could have required Brown to pay the full 
amount owed by Majestic, which at that time equaled over $500,000. R.304-306; 
308. However, on March 17, 1995, instead of demanding the full overdue balance 
owed by Majestic, Sentry required Brown to make a partial personal guaranty 
payment of $249,964.88. R.214-215; 395. Brown paid the requested $249,964.88 to 
Sentry on March 17, 1995:·R.390-391. Neither Brown nor Sentry disclosed 
Brown's partial guaranty payment to Gillett, as Gillett was not a partyto Brown's 
. guaranty contract with Sentry. R.304-06; 392. 
On April 26, 1995, Sentry was awarded a default judgment against 
Majestic for its claim for the outstanding obligation owed to Sentry by Majestic 
pursuant to the Letter Agreement. R.359. The judgment amount entered against 
Majestic was not reduced by Brown's partial guaranty payment. R.359. 
In order to recover the default judgment awarded to Sentry against 
Majestic and recoup the unpaid loan, Sentry arranged for a public auction of the 
Majestic collateral to be held on October 5, 1995. R.352-353. Consistent with 
Gillett' s personal guaranty of Sentry's loan to Majestic, some of Gillett' s personal 
assets were additionally sold at the auction. R.179; 213. 
After the auction, there was disagreement between Gillett and Sentry 
regarding the accounting from the auction of Majestic' s collateral. R.355-358. On 
December 4, 1996, Gillett signed a Mutual Release with Sentry. R.948. See Mutual 
Release at R.317, attached at Addendum I. The plain language of the Release 
precludes suit between the parties over matters arising from Sentry's loan to 
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Majestic, Sentry s subsequent foreclosure on Majestic' s collateral, and the auction 
held by Majestic; the Release also specifically states that the parties will release 
and hold harmless Boyd Brown for claims arising from the subject loan. R.317. 
At a deposition of Jonathan Ruga (CEO of Sentry) in March 2002 for 
another matter, Gillett learned that Brown had made a partial guaranty payment 
to Sentry in 1995. R.182 .. 
Status of Majestic Airlines Inc. 
Majestic Airlines, Inc. was registered as a Utah business on March 21, 1984. 
R.330-331. Majestic's business registration expired June 1, 1993. R.330-331. 
Majestic was again registered on January 18, 1995, and its registration again 
expired April 1, 1996. R.330-331. Majestic Airlines, Inc. is not currently registered 
as a business. R330-331. Majestic Airlines, Inc. has been dissolved as a company 
since 1996, and Gillett's shares in Majestic were disposed of through his 1998 
personal bankruptcy proceedings. R.336; 375. 
Procedural History 
Gillett originally filed his Complaint, case no. 070409723, in June of 20071. 
R.425; 901. Case no. 070409723 was dismissed without prejudice, and Gillett re-
1 In their opening brief, Gillett alleged for the first time that he originally filed a 
Complaint for the claims alleged in the case at bar in 2003, case number 
030919800 (Appellant's Brief, pg. 17 of hard copy, pg. 19 of digital copy). As 
evidenced by Gillett' s failure to cite to the Record for such Complaint and case, 
such allegation was never made to the trial court; indeed, Gillett alleged to the 
trial court that this matter was filed in 2007 as case no. 070409723, and the trial 
court confirmed that this matter was first filed in 2007. R.901; 946; 949-50. 
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filed his Complaint under the" savings statute" on September 29, 2008. R.901; 
946; 949-950. Gillett's Complaint alleges 1) Breach of Contract against Brown; 2) 
Breach of Contract against Sentry and SFC; 3) Fraud against Brown; 4) Judicial 
Accounting; and 5) Declaratory Judgment. R.947. 
At the time Gillett filed his Complaint, Boyd Brown was re~iding in 
Wyoming, but at all relevant 'times he was a resident of Salt Lake City and had an 
agent within the State of Utah. R.946. Sentry and its previous subsidiary, SFC 
Aircraft Corp I, are Utah corporations. R.947. 
On August 24, 2012, Gillett submitted a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. R.171-215. On October 10, 2012, Brown submitted a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Gillett' s motion and in support of Brown's Counter-Motion for 
Summary Judgment. R.271-397. 
After extensive briefing and a hearing on the parties' motions on 
December 16, 2013, the trial court granted Brown's Counter-Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dismissing Gillett's Complaint with prejudice. R.913-15. The trial 
court found that Majestic had wound up its business and ceased to exist; the 
statute of limitations for Gillett' s claims of breach of contract had run in 2001, six 
years after Gillett/Majestic' s initial breach of the Letter Agreement; and that the 
statute of limitations for Gillett's claims of fraud had run in 2005, three years 
after Gillett discovered Brown's partial guaranty payment. 
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Gillett thereafter submitted a Rule 59 Motion for New Trial and Rule 60(b) 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment. R.606-08. Instead of submitting a Memorandum 
in Support his motion, Gillett submitted a document otherwise identical to the 
motion document, except it was electronically submitted as "Memorandum of 
. Law in Support Plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion for New Trial and Rule 60(b) Motion 
.. 
to Set Aside Judgment." R.609-11; 950. Counsel for Brown notified counsel for 
Gillett of an error in his submission, but Gillett did not resubmit a Memorandum 
of Law. R.893; 921; 950. 
Without an opportunity to .review Gillett' s Memorandu~ of Law, Brown 
submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to the post-trial motions based upon 
the limited content of Gillett' s "Motion" document (R.881-901) and Affidavit of 
Gillett (R.612-14), and after Gillett failed to timely submitted a reply 
memorandum, Brown filed a Request to Submit Plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion for 
New Trial and Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Judgment for Decision, on April 
14, 2014. R.920-23. Gillett subsequently submitted his Reply supporting the Rule 
50 and Rule 60(b) motions. R.926-33. 
Although Gillett' s Rule 59 and Rule 60(b) motions were not accompanied 
by a memorandum of law, the district court prepared and entered a Ruling on 
Gillett' s post-trial motions, in which the district court provided the factual and 
legal basis for its decision to deny such motions. R.946-56. 
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Gillett subsequently filed the appeal at bar. R.957-58. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In the summary judgment proceedings below, Gillett failed to present 
issues of material fact to preclude summary judgment. The trial court correctly 
held that the statute of limitations for Gillett' s cause of action of fraud expired in 
2005. This case was filed.in 2008. Even considering the savings statute, Utah 
Code Ann.§ 78B-2-111, Gillett failed to file his cause of action of fraud within the 
. statute of lrmitations when he filed his initial case in 2007, and as such the trial 
court correctly dismissed the fraud claims with prejudice. 
The trial court correctly held that the statute of limitations for Gillett's 
cause of action for breach of contract commenced in 1995 and ran in 2001. The 
trial court determined that the concealment at issue was an alleged concealment 
of fraud which therefore tolled the statute of limitations until 2002; the statute of 
limitations for any concealed fraud expired in 2005. The trial court also found 
that the parties signed a release of all claims in 1996 which released all claims 
thereby except for Gillett' s alleged claim of fraud, discovered in 2002 and expired 
in 2005. 
Gillett's appeal is meritless as it does not provide a basis in the law to 
overturn the trial court's decision and further attempts to continue to drag out 
this lawsuit, which the trial court termed to be "merely a veiled attempt to take a 
l l 
second bite at the apple." R.955. Gillett' s Brief attempts to raise arguments and 
present material that were not raised properly before the trial court. Gillett' s 
Brief is deficient according to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in that the 
Brief does not support the arguments presented therein with analysis or 
application of applicable law _anc!. is predominantly conjecture and opinion, not 
· legal argument based on the ~aw and so fails tn provide adequate legal analysis 
and legal authority in support of his claims. Thus Gillett has inappropriately 
compelled Brown to develop Gillett' s argument through his own research and 
interpretation of Gillett's ·Brie~ as well as respond accordingly. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED BROWN'S COUNTER 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Gillett has limited the appeal to the trial court's ruling on the counter-
motions for summary judgment. See Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal, R.957-58. Gillett 
has not pursued an appeal on any of the trial court's subsequent rulings. 
Accordingly, in determining whether the trial court properly granted summary 
judgment, this Court should limit its consideration to the arguments before the 
trial court at the time it granted Brown's counter-motion for summary judgment. 
As noted above, to the extent that the trial court's Ruling addresses the summary 
judgment, it too is properly considered. 
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A. Gillett Has Presented No Disputed Material Facts That Preclude 
Summary Judgment 
Gillett' s Brief provides three material facts as being in dispute and which 
thus prevent summary judgment; "1. Boyd Brown's continuous (since mid-1990s) 
residence out-of-state, as asserted by Plaintiffs ... and as acknowledged by 
Defendants." Appellant's Brief ,r 22: "2. The claims of Majestic Airlines were 
pursuant to the 'winding up' of its corporate affairs." Appellant's Brief 'U22. "3. 
Majestic Airlines' default in making the monthly repayments does not 
necessarily constitute a 'breach' ... " Appellant's Brief ,r22. To the extent that these 
three statements are facts, as opposed to questions of law, none are dispositive of 
the grant of summary judgment as will be fully illustrated below. 
First, Gillett noted that both Defendants and Plaintiffs recognized Boyd 
Brown's residence out of state. R.946. This fact is clearly not in dispute and was 
not in dispute when the trial court determined correctly that "[j]urisdiction, both 
subject matter and personal, are appropriate before this court." Ruling ,r2 citing 
Complaint at if 7, Addendum C at R.947. Thus Gillett' s first disputed fact is not a 
disputed material fact that prevents summary judgment pursuant to Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Rule 56. 
Second, Majestic Airlines was found to "no longer be a viable corporation, 
Majestic' s winding-up period has expired." Order from Hearing on Motions for 
Summary Judgment if 2, Addendum Bat R.914. Majestic was "dissolved as a 
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corporation in or about April 1996. Therefore, the true party in interest is David 
K Gillett." Ruling ,r3, Addendum C at R.948. This fact was cited in Gillett' s Brief 
as preventing summary judgment though there is no reference to why and/ or 
how this fact matters in regards to preventing summary judgment. Even if this 
fact were in dispute it would not prevent summary judgment. The trial court 
found that Majestic Airlines' winding-up period had expired'in both its Order 
from Hearing on Motions for Summary Judgment and in the later Ruling, as 
noted above. 
"A trial court1s findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous." Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2009 UT 81, ,r 17, 222 P.3d 
1164 citing Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ,r 19, 100 P.3d 1177. "A party challenging 
a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding." Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(a)(9) (2015). Thus, for Gillett to challenge this 
finding of fact, he would need to have marshaled the evidence. "To establish that 
a factual finding is clearly erroneous, the appealing party must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most 
favorable to the court below." Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2009 UT 81, 
,r 17,222 P.3d 1164 citing State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, ,r 17, 124 P.3d 235 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). "If the evidence is inadequately marshaled, this court 
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assumes that all findings are adequately supported by the evidence." Traco Steel 
Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2009 UT 81, ,r 17,222 P.3d 1164 (internal citations 
omitted). Gillett's second disputed fact has not been properly challenged and as 
such does not prevent summary judgment. 
Third, Gillett contends that Majestic Airlines' default in making the 
· monthly repayments does not necessarily constitute a breach. The trial court 
found that the "Plaintiffs were the first party to breach the contract at issue in 
1995." R.947. The trial court cited to Plaintiff Gillett' s Complaint to show that "In 
1994 Majestic Airlines entered into a contract with Defendants ... " and, "In or 
about March 1995, Majestic was in default on the terms of the agreement it had 
with Sentry." Ruling at ,2 citing Complaint at,, 13 and 19, Addendum Cat 
R.947. The trial court determined that under the first breach doctrine, Plaintiff's 
default represented the first breach. "[U]nder the first breach rule a party first 
guilty of a substantial or material breach of contract cannot complain if the other 
party thereafter refuses to perform. He can neither insist on performance by the 
other party nor maintain an action ... for a subsequent failure to perform." Cross 
v. Olsen, 2013 UT App 135, , 25, 303 P.3d 1030 citing CCD, LC v. Millsap, 2005 UT 
42,, 29, 116 P.3d 366 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Further, "[w]hether a breach of a contract constitutes a material breach is a 
question of fact .... " Cross v. Olsen, 2013 UT App 135,, 29,303 P.3d 1030 citing 
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Orlob v. Wasatch Med. Mgmt., 2005 UT App 430, ,r 26, 124 P.3d 269. Thus the trial 
court's factual determination of the breach can only be challenged by Appellant's 
marshaling of the evidence, in accord with the discussion of the second disputed 
fact above. Namely, "If the evidence is inadequately marshaled, this court 
assumes that all findings are adequately supported by the evidence." Traco Steel 
Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc.~ 2009 UT 81, ,r 17,222 P.3d 1164 (internal citations 
omitted). Thus, Gillett's third disputed fact has not been properly challenged and 
as such does not prevent summary judgment. 
B. Appellees Are Entitled To Summary Judgment As A Matter Of Law 
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). As noted, Gillett has not presented this Court with 
any genuine issue of material fact that prevents summary judgment. Thus, 
summary judgment is proper as a matter of law pursuant to the trial court's 
determination that "[t]he parties signed a release of all claims in 1996. All claims 
are thereby released except for Plaintiff's claim of fraud, which was discovered in 
2002. The statute of limitations for fraud expired in 2005." R.914. This Court has 
held that, summary judgment is appropriate where failure to provide reasons, as 
required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), to support the contention that disputes of 
material of fact existed. Brown v. Wanlass, 2001 UT App 30, 18 P.3d 1137. Further, 
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the Supreme Court of Utah has held that, an appellate court "may affirm a grant 
of summary judgment upon any grounds apparent in the record." Park v. 
Stanford, 2011 UT 41, ,r 27,258 P.3d 566. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED AND APPLIED THE 
APPROPRIATE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
A. Appellant's Issues II, III, And IV Were Raised Fo.r The First Time In The 
Appellant's Brief And As Such Were Not Preserved And Are Not 
Properly Presented To This Court 
"It is a well-established rule that a defendant who fails to bring an issue 
before the trial court is generally barred from raising it the first time on appeal." 
State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The arguments II, III, and IV, 
raised by Gillett in this appeal were not properly raised before the trial court and 
as such were not preserved for appeal. See Appellant's Brief, "Preservation," at 
,r,r7-10. However, even if these issues had been duly preserved, they would not 
have changed the trial court1s correct decision to grant summary judgment in 
Brown's favor. 
Gillett states that his Issues II and III were "preserved for appeal within 
the plaintiffs' 11 motion for new trial", together with the supplemental materials 
related thereto." Appellant's Brief, ,r,rs-9 (internal quotations in original). As 
noted above, this appeal is from the trial court's ruling on the counter-motions 
for summary judgment. See Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal, R.957-58. 11 An appeal of 
a Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) order addresses only the propriety of the denial or grant 
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of relief. The appeal does not, at least in most cases, reach the merits of the 
underlying judgment from. which relief was sought." Franklin Covey Client Sales v. 
Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, ,r 1, 2 P.3d 451. 
Similarly, a denial of a Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 59 motion for new trial is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and the appellate court will 
reverse the trial court"' only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision." Smith 
v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, 1 25, 82 P.3d 1064. Thus, issues presented for 
the first time on appeal through Plaintiff's motions for new trial and to set aside 
judgment should not be considered by this Court pursuant to precedent that, 
u(a]n inquiry into the merits of the underlying judgment or order must be the 
subject of a direct appeal from. that judgment or order." Franklin Covey Client 
Sales v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, 11, 2 P.3d 451. Because these were not raised 
below, and because Gillett has provided no additional basis for this Court to 
review an issue not preserved in the trial court, Gillett has waived the right to 
present this issue on appeal. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Applied The 3-Year Statute of Limitation For 
Fraud 
As noted above, this issue, Appellant's Issue II, was not properly 
preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs' motions for new trial and to set aside 
judgment. In further support of the argument that this issue was not properly 
presented to the trial court and so should not be considered in this appeal, the 
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trial court noted that, 
On March 15, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their Rule 59(b) and 60(b) Motion. 
Although the docket reflects that Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in 
support, the memorandum is the exact same as the original Motion. 
That is, both documents are approximately three (3) pages long and 
do not provide any legal support, analysis or discussion. The Court 
finds that Plaintiffs' arguments, as reflected in the Motion, are 
untenable. 
Ruling," Analysis and Discussion," Addendum Cat R.950. 
This Court has previously established how to determine if an issue is 
proper to be considered on appeal in that, "[t]he trial court must address an 
argument before it may be considered on appeal." Holman v. Callister, Duncan & 
Nebeker, 905 P.2d 895, 895 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The Court further emphasized 
that, "The argument must be reasonably discernible from the pleadings, 
affidavits and exhibits." Id. Additionally, "even when an appellate court liberally 
construes the record in favor of a party, as it must on review of a summary 
judgment, there must be a factual showing or submission of legal authority 
before the argument will be deemed to have been raised at the trial court level." 
Id. Thus, pursuant to the standard provided in Holman, Gillett did not properly 
present the arguments to the trial court and as such they are not properly 
considered for appeal. 
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C. Even If Non-Preserved Arguments Are Addressed, They Further Show 
That The Trial Court Correctly Determined And Applied The Proper 
Statute Of Limitations In Granting Summary Judgment For Brown 
1. The Trial Court Correctly Applied the 3-year Statute of Limitations 
for Fraud 
Gillett alleged breach of contract claims against Brown, Sentry, and SFC; as 
well as a claim of fraud against Brown. R.9-12; 947. In 1994, Gillett/Majestic 
entered into a contract with Sentry where Brown was a guarantor of the loan 
from Sentry to Gillett/Majestic. R.393; 947. Gillett/Majestic had defaulted on the 
terms of the agreement with Sentry by or about March 1995. R.947. Gillett alleged 
in his Complaint that after Majestic defaulted on the loan Brown made a 
guarantor's payment to Sentry in or about July 1995. R.947. Gillett alleges he was 
unaware of this payment until March 2002. R.9; 947. The parties entered into a 
Mutual Release in which Gillett/Majestic released all their claims against 
Brown/Sentry. R.8; 947. Gillett alleges that they did not learn about the "fraud" 
of Brown - not disclosing his guarantor's payment made to Sentry - until March 
of 2002, which Gillett claims fraudulently induced his signing the Release. R.948. 
However, as illustrated by the trial court, this alleged fraud occurred well 
after Gillett/Majestic' s breach of contract. R.948. The trial court determined that 
"[a]lthough concealment is at issue, the concealment pertains to Defendants' 
I 
alleged fraud inducing Plaintiffs to sign the release in December 1996, which 
Plaintiffs alleged to not have discovered until March 2002." R.949. The trial court 
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determined that "because the alleged fraud was discovered by Plaintiffs in 
March 2002, Plaintiffs' third cause of action, Fraud against Mr. Brown ran in 
March 2005." R.950. The trial court detailed the basis for this finding and further 
stated, "Moreover, Plaintiffs' June 2007 case 070409723, filed in West Jordan, did 
not save or otherwise preserve Plaintiffs' fraud claim because it was still filed 
two (2) years after the three (3) year statute of limitation had run." R.950. 
On appeal, Gillett references only one case in the first ten pages of his 
argument, Russell Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741. 
Appellant's Brief, if if 23-24. Gillett does not provide any analysis of Russell 
Packard to the instant case. However, at one point Gillett states that 
"commencement of that statute was 'tolled' pursuant to the 'equitable discovery' 
doctrine articulated in Russell Packard ... " Appellant's Brief if23 (internal 
quotations and bold in original). Gillett later states "the District Court seemingly 
correctly applied the 'fraudulent concealment' doctrine (from Packard 
Development, supra)." Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 
741 (internal quotations and bold in original). Gillett concluded that the district 
court erred in its subsequent selection and application of the 3-year statute of 
limitations to bar the claims. Id. 
In Russell Packard, the Court took the "opportunity to first clarify the 
appropriate circumstances under and the means by which the discovery rule 
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may operate to toll a statute of limitations." Russell Packard Dev. v. Carson, 2005 
UT 14, ,r 19, 108 P.3d 741. The Court specifically provided that "[a]n example of a 
statutory discovery rule is found in the three-year statute of limitations 
governing claims based on fraud or mistake, which provides that a cause of 
action will not accrue "until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting the fraud or mistake." Russell Packard Dev. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ,r 
21, 108 P.3d 741 citing Utah Code Ann.§ 78-12-26(3) (2002) current Utah Code 
Ann.§ 78B-2-305 (2015). The Court in Russell Packard stated that the 
determination of when a plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have 
discovered their cause of action can be difficult/ fact intensive. Id. However, 
" [ o ]nee the triggering event identified by the statutory discovery rule occurs--i.e., 
when a plaintiff first has actual or constructive knowledge ... of the cause of 
action--the statutory limitations period begins to run and a plaintiff who desires 
to file a claim must do so within the time specified in the statute. Otherwise, the 
claim will be barred." Russell Packard Dev. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ,r 22. Further, 
the Court held, "Mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action will neither 
prevent the running of the statute of limitations nor excuse a plaintif Ps failure to 
file a claim within the relevant statutory period." Id. at 20. 
This case is nearly identical to the specific example/ explanation provided 
in Russell Packard, where applying a statutory discovery rule contained in the 3-
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year statute of limitations for fraud, the statute would begin running from the 
date a plaintiff either discovered or should have discovered their claim. Id. at 23. 
"A plaintiff would then have three years from that date within which to file a 
complaint before the statute would bar recovery on the claim." Id. Gillett alleges 
that Brown's fraudulent concealment was discovered in 2002. R.8-12. Thus, the 
trial c~urt correctly determined that the statutory 3-year statute of li:rcitations for 
fraud would apply, thereby establishing that the statute of limitations ran in 2005 
and Gillett's suit filed in 2007 did not save or preserve the fraud claim. R.949. 
This conclusion would be reached even if the concealment version of the 
discovery doctrine applied. However, the Court in Russell Packard stated that, .,.,it 
would be inappropriate to apply the concealment version of the discovery rule in 
the context of the three-year statute of limitations for fraud." Id. at 25. The Court 
stated that, .,.,the concealment version of the discovery rule does not 
automatically operate to toll the limitations period until the plaintiff's actual or 
~ constructive discovery of his or her claim." Russell Packard Dev. v. Carson, 2005 
UT 14,126. Thus under either version of the discovery rule, Gillett's knowledge 
of a possible fraudulent concealment issue commenced the statute of limitations, 
for 3-years, from 2002 to 2005. As such the trial court correctly granted summary 
judgment based on relevant statute of limitations and should be affirmed by this 
Court. 
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2. The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted And Analyzed Utah Code 
§ 78B-2-104, Absence From The State, On The Statute Of Limitations 
In This Case 
Even though Gillett failed to support his argument for tolling the statute of 
limitations based on absence from the state, the trial court addressed the 
contentions and found, u Although Plaintiffs specifically cite Section 78B-2-104 in 
its Motion, following Defendants'_Opposition, Plaintiffs, in their Reply, assert 
that the pre-2008 amended version, Section 78-12-35 is applicable. The Court 
finds that under either version Plaintiffs' claim that Mr. Brown's out-of-state 
resident status tolls the statute of limitations fails." R.951. 
The trial court found that "'in signing the April 29, 1994, Letter Agreement 
and Guarantee and Waiver, Mr. Brown consented to resolve all matters in the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah." R.951-52. Also, "'neither party disputes the validity of the forum 
selection clauses." R. 952. The trial court determined that Gillett misconstrued the 
statutory language of Utah Code § 78-12-35, and therefore, the purpose of the 
provision. See Snyder v. Clune, 390 P.2d 915, 916 (Utah 1964) (The Utah Supreme 
Court explained "'that the objective of [78-12-35] was to prevent a defendant from 
depriving a plaintiff of the opportunity of suing him by absenting himself from 
the state during the period of limitation.") R.953. 
Gillett did not argue that he was unable to locate Brown; rather he argued 
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that he was inconvenienced in having to serve and depose Brown, who was 
living in Wyoming. R.954. The trial court concluded stating, "The fact that Mr. 
Brown was served in Wyoming and the alleged inconvenience of Plaintiffs in 
attempting to timely depose Mr. Brown does not invoke Section 78-12-35 and 
therefore does not toll the statute of limitations of Plaintiffs' breach of contract 
. . 
and fraud claims." R.954. See Tracey v. Blood, 3 P.2d 263,266 (Utah 1931) 
(" Apparently all courts are agreed ... that the burden was upon the plaintiff to 
plead and prove facts sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.") R.954-55. 
Therefore, the trial court correctly denied Gillett' s argument in this regard. R.955. 
3. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That Majestic Airlines Period For 
Winding-Up Had Expired 
Gillett argues that Utah Code§ 16-l0a-1405 does not provide a stated 
period of limitations for the winding-up of a corporate entity. Appellant's Brief, 
,IlO. In Gillett' s argument regarding the trial court's winding-up ruling, Gillett 
fails to cite to any relevant case law for support and/ or analysis for his opinions 
regarding corporate winding up. Appellant's Brief, 1153-55. Gillett fails to 
provide an argument in regards to a possible change in the result that could be 
affected by establishing that the winding-up period had not expired. However, 
even if Gillett had provided an argument in this regard it would fail. The trial 
court found that Majestic Airlines was dissolved as a corporation in April 1996. 
R.948. This is a non-disputed question of fact because it is based on public record, 
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specifically the Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code business 
records for Majestic Airlines show the corporation was expired in April 1996. 
R.330-31. 
Gillett's interpretation of Utah Code§ 16-l0a-1405 ignores the provision 
regarding disposition of claims against a dissolved corporation in § 16-l0a-1407 
·. which states, "A dissolved corporation may publish notice of its dissolution and 
request persons with claims against the corporation present them in accordance 
with the notice." Id. (1) (2015). Further, the statute explicitly states that any claim 
unless sooner barred under§ 16-l0a-1406 or other applicable statute of 
limitations is barred unless the claimant commences an action against the 
dissolved corporation within five years after publication of the notice, or after 
seven years if no notification was published. Utah Code Ann.§ 16-l0a-1407(3)-(5) 
(2015). Thus, if claims are barred against a dissolved corporation after 5-7 years, 
then claims should intuitively be barred on behalf of a dissolved corporation to 
the same respect. 
When interpreting statutes, Utah case law dictates that all parts of an act 
are considered, as a whole, for a complete understanding/ interpretation of the 
section; pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's instruction to "read the plain 
language of [a] statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in harmony with 
other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." State v. Harker, 2010 UT 
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56, ,I 12, 240 P.3d 780. The trial court's determination that Majestic' s time period 
for winding-up had expired was in accord with the relevant statute. Further, this 
issue was not properly presented for appeal nor has it been properly supported 
by citation to law and the record, nor does this argument change the outcome of 
the summary judgment decision. As such this argument does not provide this 
Court a basis for overturning the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
4. The Trial Court Correctly Analyzed And Applied The First Breach 
Doctrine To This Case 
"[U]nder the first breach rule a party first guilty of a substantial or material 
breach of contract cannot complain if the other party thereafter refuses to 
perform. He can neither insist on performance by the other party nor maintain an 
action against the other party for a subsequent failure to perform." Cross v. Olsen, 
2013 UT App 135, ,I 25, 303 P.3d 1030 citing CCD, LC v. Millsap, 2005 UT 42, ,I 29, 
116 P.3d 366 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that "Only a material breach will excuse further performance by 
the non-breaching party." McArthur v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2012 UT 22, 
,I 28 n.7, 274 P.3d 981. Utah case precedent further provides, "Whether a breach 
of a contract constitutes a material breach is a question of fact .... " Cross v. 
Olsen, 2013 UT App 135, ,I 29 citing Orlob v. Wasatch Med. Mgmt., 2005 UT App 
430, ,I 26, 124 P.3d 269. 
The Court in Cross stated, "Summary judgment is appropriate on such 
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factual questions when they fall on either end of a factual continuum: when there 
could be no reasonable difference of opinion, or when the facts are so tenuous, 
vague, or insufficiently established that determining [the factual issue] becomes 
completely speculative." Cross v. Olsen, 2013 UT App 135, ,r 29 citing Harline v. 
Barker, 912 P.2d 433,439 (Utah 1996) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
The case at hand presents a factual question appropriate for summary 
judgment pursuant to the standard expressed in Cross, above. Namely, both 
parties acknowledged that the loan between Gillett/Majestic and Sentry was 
meant to be paid back in monthly installments and further acknowledge that 
Majestic defaulted on those payments. Clearly where a contract is based on 
borrowing money to be paid back on a monthly basis, defaulting on payments is 
a material breach of the contract. Because Gillett/Majestic defaulted on the 
contract, the trial court correctly ruled that, "Plaintiffs' were the first party to 
breach the contract at issue in 1995 and therefore, the six (6) year statute of 
limitations expired in 2001." R.948-49. 
III. APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS DEFICIENT AND/OR MERITLESS AND/OR 
FRIVOLOUS 
A. Appellant's Brief Failed To Meet Utah R. App. P. 24(k)'s Requirements 
And Placed A Tremendous Burden Of Factual And Legal Research on 
Opposing Counsel 
Rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires a brief to be 
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11concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and 
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. 11 Utah R. 
App. P. 24(k) (2015). If the brief does not meet these requirements, rule 24(k) 
states that 11 the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 11 Id. 
"This court has previously awarded attorney fees where the failure to file an 
opening brief that complied with rule 24(k) placed a tremendous burden of 
factual and legal research on opposing counsel." Simmons Media Grp., LLC v. 
Waykar, LLC, 2014 UT App 145, ,r 48,335 P.3d 885 citing In re Estate of Pahl, 2007 
UT App 389, ,r 17, 174 P.3d 642 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The Utah Court of Appeals addressed the requirements under Rule 24(k) 
and stated, "Failure to adhere to these requirements increase[ s] the costs of 
litigation for both parties and unduly burden[ s] the judiciary's time and energy. 
Failure to adhere to the requirements may invite the court to impose serious 
consequences, such as disregarding or striking the briefs, or assessing attorney 
fees against the offending lawyer." Ninow v. Lowe (In re Estate of Pahl), 2007 UT 
App 389, ,r 17, 174 P.3d 642 citing State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, Pll, 99 P.3d 820 
(alterations in original) (citation omitted). 
In Ninow, the Court of Appeals awarded reasonable attorney fees after the 
Petitioner pointed to several aspects of the Respondents' brief that failed to meet 
the briefing requirements and complained of the 11convoluted 11 nature of 
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Respondents' opening brief with many issues completely lacking in cogent 
analysis or supporting authority. See Ninow, at 18. The Court held that O a 
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent 
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may 
dump the burden of argument and research." Id. at 17. 
Gillett's appeal is frivolous pursuant to Utah R. App. P. Rule 33, which· 
states that "a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." Utah R. App. P. Rule 33 
(2015). As noted by the trial court, i/Plaintiffs' objections are merely a veiled 
attempt to take a second bite at the apple and are therefore overruled." R.955. 
This lawsuit has taken years to finally be correctly dismissed pursuant to 
summary judgment, at great cost to both parties as well as the judicial system. 
The only new facts/ arguments presented by Gillett on appeal are improper for 
not being preserved but regardless were still thoroughly addressed and denied 
by the trial court as being misinterpretations and mischaracterizations of law. 
Finally, Gillett's appeal is so bereft of argument supported by law that it has 
placed a disproportionate burden on the opposing party and this Court to both 
decipher what arguments are being made by Gillett and to determine what, if 
any, support can be found for the contentions within relevant case law only to 
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also research and argue against these points as well as provide legal argument in 
support of the trial court's already detailed ruling. 
Thus, pursuant to Rule 33(a), if the Court determines that an appeal is 
frivolous, uit shall award just damages, which may include single or double 
costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/ or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing 
party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the •. 
party's attorney." Utah R. App. P. Rule 33. The Supreme Court of Utah granted a 
motion for sanctions on an appeal taken from claims dismissed by the trial court 
on summary judgment after the trial court had stated the plaintiff1s claims 
bordered on being frivolous and the plaintiff failed to defend the motion for 
sanctions. Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 970 P.2d 1265, 1272 (Utah 1998). 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. Rule 34, "Except as otherwise provided by 
law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment or order is 
affirmed, costs shall be taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered ... " 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 34 (2015). This Court may award appellee costs under this 
rule even if Gillett' s appeal is not found to be frivolous. See Colony Ins. Co. v. 
Human Ensemble, LLC, 2013 UT App 68, 299 P.3d 465. Thus, because Gillett' s Brief 
and/ or Appeal are deficient, meritless, and/ or frivolous, attorney fees and costs 
should be awarded to Defendant/ Appellees. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the trial court's grant of 
Defendants' Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment, and award 
Defendants/ Appellees the attorney's fees they have incurred on appeal. 
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ADDENDUM A 
ORDER TRANSFERRING REVIEW TO UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
(R.963-66) 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURT~ 
IN 1HE SUPREME COURT OF 1HE STATE OF UTAH 
David K. Gillett, an individual 
and Majestic Airlines, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, 
-oo0oo-
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Boyd J. Brown, an individual; 
Sentry Financial Corporation, 
a Utah corporation; and SFC 
Aircraft Corp I, a Utah corporation; 
Defendants and Appellees. 
ORDER 
Case No. 20140682-SC 
080921211 
AUG -5 2014 
Pursuant to rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this matter will be 
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition unless a timely request for 
retention (as detailed below) is received. This order may also be superseded by another 
order directing an immediate transfer if the Court deems such a transfer to be 
appropriate. Following transfer, all further pleadings and correspondence should be 
directed to the Court of Appeals. 
Within ten calendar days of the date of this order, any party to the appeal may submit a 
letter to the Supreme Court concerning the appropriateness of retaining the matter on 
its own docket. The letter may request retention or may request transfer. The letter 
shall contain the following four categories of information, preceded by a heading 
describing each category: 
1. The name of the case and the appellate case number, 
2. ~e names of all parties involved in the case and the attorneys and firms 
representing the parties, 
3. A concise statement of the issues presented on appeal, and 
4. A brief explanation of the reasons supporting retention or transfer. 
The Checklist for Appellate Jurisdiction (included with notice of this order) must also 
be completed and returned with any letter requesting retention. Failure to complete 
and return the cl1ecklist will preclude consideration of a request for retention. 
The letter and checklist may not be combined with any other document or pleading. 
The letter shall not exceed five pages (excluding the checklist) and must be received 
with.in ten calendar days of the date of this order. The Court will not consider any 
letter requesting retention that is received after the ten-day deadline. In the event the 
deadline falls on a weekend or holiday, the letter must be received by the first business 
day thereafter. 
Any response to a timely letter requesting retention must be filed with this Court with.in 
seven calendar days of service of that letter. The response may not exceed five pages. 
In the event the matter is transferred by superseding order prior to expiration of the 
deadline, an otherwise timely request for retention will be treated as a request for recall 
from the Court of Appeals. 
FOR THE COURT: 
ndrea R. Martinez 
Clerk of Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SER\11CE 
. . . . 
I hereby certify that on August('.)- , 2014;, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER was sent by electronic mail to be delivered to: 
STEPHEN G. HOMER 
shomerlaw@netzero,com 
CHRISTOPHER M. AULT 
chris@aultlegal.com 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: JULIE RIGBY AND CHERYL AIONO 
450 S ST ATE ST BX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
chery la@utcourts.gov, julier@utcourts.gov 
Judicial Assistant 
Case No. 20140682-SC 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 080921211 
Checklist for Appellate Jurisdiction 
(If a request for retention is submitted, this form rnust be returned with that request and must provide all applicable 
infonnation or the request for retention will uot be considered by the Court. Any additional infonnation relevant to 
jurisdiction may be included in the letter requesting retention) 
The case number in the lower court _______ _ 
The date the final judgment was entered or, if the time for appeal was reinstated pursuant to Subparts (f) 
or (g) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the date of reinstatement ________ _ 
The date of the filing of the appeal to which this retention request is directed ________ _ 
Whether any other appeals or cross-appeals in the same case have been filed: Yes 
The date(s) of those appeal(s) 
Whether the judgment listed above resolved the case as to all claims and parties: Yes 
No __ . 
No __ 
If no, whether the judgment was certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure: Yes No . List the date of certification ________ _ 
Whether the judgment listed above included a ruling concerning attorney fees: Yes No 
If attorney fees were awarded at any time, whether the amounts of all awards of fees were fixed prior to 
the date of your latest appeal: Yes__ No__ Not Applicable __ . List the date of the last order 
fixing the fees: ________ _ 
Whether Rule 4(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure is applicable: Yes No __ 
If yes, list the date of any motion listed in Rule 4(b) _________ and the date of 
resolution of that motion ________ _ 
Whether Rule 4(c) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure is applicable: Yes No __ 
Whether Rule 7(£)(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure has been satisfied (see CUWCD. v. King, 2013 UT 13): 
Yes_._ No __ Not Applicable __ . 
If yes, list the date of the order satisfying Rule 7(£)(2) ________ _ 
If no, list any actions that have been taken to comply with the requirements of Rule 7(f)(2): 
Whether the time to file the appeal was extended: Yes__ No __ . List the date of any motion for 
an extension ________ and the date of the order extending the time ________ _ 
Whether the appeal was filed pursuant to Utah Code§ 78B-11-129: Yes__ No If yes, list the 
subsection(s) of that provision that is (are) applicable: ____ _ 
The statutory provision conferring appellate jurisdiction on this Court - ie., the applicable subsection of 
Utah Code§ 78A-3-102 ( ____ ) (rev. 1/2014) 
ADDENDUMB 
ORDER FROM HEARING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
[HEARING HELD DECEMBER 16r 2013] 
(R.913-15) 
Christopher M. Ault, # 11000 
Zachary W. Powell, #14756 
THE AULT FIRM, P.C. 
8817 S. Redwood Rd., Ste. A 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
Telephone: (801) 539-9000 
Facsimile: (801) 207-1056 
Email: zachary@aultlegal.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
The Order of Court is stated below: 
Dated: April 13, 2014 Isl L. A 
11:03:lOPM 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID K. GILLETT, an individual, and 
MAJESTIC AIRLINES, 
INCORPORATED, a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER FROM HEARING ON 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
(December 16, 2013) 
V. 
BOYD J. BROWN, an individual, SENTRY ) 
FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Utah ) 
Corporation, and SFC AIRCRAFT CORP I, ) 
a Utah Corporation, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
Civil No.: 080921211 
Judge L.A. Dever 
COMES NOW the Court, having held a hearing on the parties' Motions for Summary 
Judgment on December 16, 2013, with Plaintiff represented by Steven Homer and Defendants 
represented by Christopher M. Ault and Zachary W. Powell, having considered the parties' 
motions, memoranda, declarations, and arguments made by counsel, and for good cause 
showing, 
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that: 
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1. Plaintiff Majestic is no longer a viable corporation, Majestic's winding-up period 
has expired, and Majestic may not assert any claims. 
2. Plaintiff Gillett is the successor in interest and has the right to assert Majestic's 
claims. 
3. The statute oflimitations for Plaintiff's cause of action offraud expired in 2005. 
4. Plaintiffs filed this case in 2008. 
5. Even considering the savings statute, Plaintiff failed to file his cause of action of 
fraud within the statute of limitations, and all Plaintiff's fraud claims are 
dismissed with prejudice. 
6. The statute of limitations for breach of contract is six years. 
7. Gillett and/or Majestic breached its contract with Sentry in 1995, and the statute 
of limitations ran in 2001. 
8. Concealment is at issue, but the alleged concealment was a concealment of fraud. 
The statute of limitations for the concealment is therefore tolled until 2002, and 
the statute of limitations for the concealed fraud expired in 2005. 
9. The parties signed a valid release of all claims in 1996. All claims are thereby 
released except for Plaintiff's claim of fraud, which was discovered in 2002. The 
statute of limitations for fraud expired in 2005. 
10. The Court dismisses with prejudice all claims asserted by Plaintiff in this matter. 
The Court's Signature and Date of Entry of this Order Appear on the First Page of this 
Document. 
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NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF AND COUNSEL 
Notice is hereby given that pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
any objections you have to this proposed order must be filed with the Court within 5 days of 
service of this proposed order. 
DATED this 19th day of March, 2014. 
THE AULT FIRM, P.C. 
Isl Zachary W Powell 
Zachary W. Powell 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the forgoing document was served via 
electronic filing, this 19th day of March, 2014, to the following: 
Stephen G. Homer 
2877 West 9150 South 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
Isl Zachary W. Powell 
Page I 3 
ADDENDUMC · 
RULING ON GILLETT'S RULE 59 AND RULE 60(b) MOTIONS 
(R.946-56) 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE cou~ DISTR1cr 
ST ATE OF UT AH 1rd JUdfo/a/ ofOURr 
Strfct 
14 DAVID K. GILLETT, an individual, and 
MAJESTIC AIRLINES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
BAt.:r~ ~ 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BOYD J. BROWN, an individual, 
SENTRY FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SFC AIRCRAFT 
CORP I, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Case No. 080921211 
Judge: L.A. DEVER 
The above entitled matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Notice to Submit for 
Decision their Rule 59(b) Motion for New Trial and Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment and, Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants' Judgment and this Court's entry 
thereof, filed April 29, 2014. Having reviewed Plaintiffs' Motion and Objection and 
Defendants' Oppositions thereto, and being duly advised in the premises of the matters 
before it, the Court makes the following Ruling. 
Background 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on September 29, 2008. The following are 
relevant claims as asserted by Plaintiffs in their Complaint: 
1. Defendant Boyd J. Brown was, at the time of the filing of the Complaint, a 
resident of Wyoming. (Campi. ,I 3). 
2. However, at all relevant times, Mr. Brown was a resident of Salt Lake 
County, Utah. Id. at ,I 4. 
3. Defendants Sentry Financial Corporation ("Sentry") and SFC Aircraft Corp 
I ("SFC"), are Utah corporations, with headquarters in Salt Lake County, 
Utah. Id. at 1[1J 4-5. 
4. Jurisdiction, both subject matter and personal, are appropriate before this 
Court. Id. at 1J 7. 
5. Plaintiffs; causes of action include: (1) Breach of Contract against Mr. 
• Brown, id. at 1J1J 47-48; (2) Breach of Contract against Sentry and SFC, 
id. at ffll 49-50; (3) Fraud against Mr. Brown, id. at ,m 51-58; (4) Judicial 
Accounting, id. at ffll 59-60; and (5) Declaratory Judgment, id. at ffll 61-
63. 
6. In 1994, Plaintiff Majestic Airlines ("Majestic") 1 entered into a contract with 
Defendant(s) Sentry and/or SFC. Id. at 1J 13. See also (Defs.' Opp. To 
Pis.' Mot. For Part. Summ. J. and Mem. In Supp. of Defs.' Counter Mot. 
For Summ. J. vi-x). 
7. In or about March 1995, Majestic was in default on the terms of 
agreement it had with Sentry. Id. at 1J 19. 
8. Plaintiffs allege that they were unaware of Sentry's receipt of Mr. Brown's 
$250,0002, payment until "March 2002 when such payment was disclosed 
during the deposition of Sentry officials[.]" Id. at ,I 44; see also ,r 50. 
Compare (Defs.' Opp. To Pis.' Mot. For Part. Summ. J. and Mem. In 
1Majestic has been dissolved as a company since in or about April 1996. (Defs.' Opp. To Pis.' 
Mot. For Part. Summ. J. and Mem. In Supp. of Defs.' Counter Mot. For Summ. J. x, ffll 24-25). 
2Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Complaint, this alleged payment occurred after Majestic had defaulted the 
terms of the agreement at issue, in or about July 1995. Id. at ,r 25. 
2 
Supp. of Defs.' Counter Mot. For Summ. J. 1-16). 
9. On December 6, 1996, the parties entered into a release agreement in 
which Plaintiffs released all their claims against Defendants. ld_. at 1142. 
See Compare (Defs.' Opp. To Pis.' Mot. For Part. Summ. J. and Mem. In 
Supp. of Defs.' Counter Mot. For Summ. J. Ex. F). 
10. Plaintiffs also allege that they did not "discover" Mr. Brown's alleged 
. . 
fraud31 i.e., allegedly fraudulently inducing Plaintiffs to sign the release, id. 
at '1J1J 56-57, until the "March 2002 deposition of Jonathan Ruga, SFC 
Aircraft I[.]" Id. at 1'f 53. Compare (Defs.' Opp. To Pis.' Mot. For Part. 
Summ. J. and Mem. In Supp. of Defs.' Counter Mot. For Summ. J. 1-16). 
Following a hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on 
December 16, 2013, the Court held: 
(1) Majestic is not a proper party to the entitled matter as it was dissolved as 
a corporation in or about April 1996. Therefore, the true party in interest is 
Plaintiff David K. Gillett. 
(2) Plaintiffs' were the first party to breach4 the contract at issue in 1995 and 
therefore, the six (6) year statute of limitations expired in 2001. Utah 
3Again, pursuant to Plaintiffs' Complaint, the alleged fraud "in violation of [Mr. Brown's] own 
contractual obligations" in or about April 1996, occurred well after Majestic's breach of the contract. Id. at 
1f 40. 
4See §...9... CCD, LC. v. Millsap. 2005 UT 42, ,r 29, 116 P.3d 366 ("We have explained that under 
the 'first breach' rule a party first guilty of a substantial or material breach of contract cannot complain if 
the other party thereafter refuses to perform. He can neither insist on performance by the other party nor 
maintain an action against the other party for a subsequent failure to perform." (citations and quotations 
omitted)); Saunders v. Sharp. 840 P.2d 796, 806 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that "a party committing 
a substantial breach of a contract cannot maintain an action against the other contracting party ... for a 
subsequent failure to perform if the promises are dependent." (citation omitted)). 
3 
Code Ann. §788-2-309(2) (2008). See also (Defs.' Opp. To Pis.' Mot. For 
Part. Summ. J. and Mem. In Supp. of Defs.1 Counter Mot. For Summ. J. 
Exs. A5 , 86). 
(3) Although concealment is at issue, the concealment pertains to 
Defendants' alleged fraud inducing Plaintiffs to sign the release in 
December 1996, which Plaintiffs alleged to not have discovered until 
March 2002. (Compl. 1I'fl 53, 56-57). 
(a) Because the alleged fraud was claimed to be discovered by 
Plaintiffs in March 2002, Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action, Fraud 
against Mr. Brown ran in March 2005. Moreover, Plaintiffs' June 
2007 case 070409723, filed in West Jordan, did not save or 
5The April 29, 1994 Letter Agreement, subsection 10 provides in relevant part: 
In the event of a breach by MAI (Majestic], Gillett or Boyd of any of these terms or 
conditions of the Sentry Loan Documents, MAI, Gillett and Boyd jointly and 
severally agree to pay all of Sentry's costs and expenses incurred with the 
breach[.] 
(emphasis added}. 
6The Guarantee and Waiver signed by Mr. Brown, which outlines the obligations and rights of Mr. 
Brown and Sentry, respectively, provides in relevant part: 
(b) Sentry may at any time and from time to time ... upon or without any terms or 
conditions and in whole or in part: ... (2) sell, exchange, release, surrender, 
realize upon or otherwise deal with in any manner and in any order any property 
by whomsoever at any time pledged or mortgaged to secure, or howsoever 
securing the Liabilities of the Obliger [Majestic] hereby guaranteed ... (4) settle 
or compromise any Liabilities of the Obliger hereby guaranteed, any security 
thereof, or any liability (including those hereunder) incurred directly or indirectly in 
respect or hereof, and may subordinate the payment of all or any part thereof to 
the payment of any liability {whether due or not} of the Obliger to creditors of the 
Obliger other than Sentry and the undersigned; and (5) apply any sums by 
whomsoever paid or howsoever realized to any and all Liabilities of the Obligor to 
Sentry regardless of what liability or Liabilities of the Obliger remain unpaid. 
{emphasis added). 
4 
otherwise preserve Plaintiffs' fraud claim because it was still filed 
two (2) years after the three (3) year statute of limitations had run. 
See Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-305(3) (2008); see also Hom v. Utah 
Dep't of Pub. Safety. 962 P.2d 95, 1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
(4) In order to set aside the December 1996 Mutual Release ("Release"), 
Plaintiffs' were required to have filed their Third Cause of Action, Fraud 
against Mr. Brown, no later than March 2005, which was three (3) years 
after the Plaintiffs allegedly discovered said fraud in March 2002. Having 
failed to timely file any fraud claim until 2007, the Release therefore 
appropriately applies to Plaintiffs' remaining claims. 
Analysis and Discussion 
1 Plaintiffs Rule 59(b) and 60(b) Motion 
On March 15, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their Rule 59(b) and 60(b) Motion. Although 
the docket reflects that Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in support, the memorandum is 
the exact same as the original Motion. That is, both documents are approximately 
three (3) pages long and do not provide any legal support, analysis, or discussion. The 
Court finds that Plaintiffs' arguments, as reflected in the Motion, are untenable. 
First, Plaintiffs assert that "the Court misapprehended (and thus overlooked" the 
true 'contractually-based' nature of the Plaintiffs' claim (against SENTRY) and instead 
improperly converted Plaintiffs' claims to allege 'fraud,' for which a shorter statute of 
7 ("Simple ignorance of or obliviousness to the existence of a cause of action will not prevent the 
running of the statute of limitations. All that is required to trigger the statute of limitations is ... sufficient 
information to ... put [plaintiffs] on notice to make further inquiry if they harbor doubts or questions." 
(citations and quotations omitted)). 
5 
limitation would apply." (Pis.' R. 59{b) and 60(b) Mot. 2). This claim is inconsistent with 
the Court's December 16, 2013, ruling, in which the Court specifically found that the 
contractual claims, i.e., Plaintiffs' first and second causes of action, were barred by the 
six (6) year statute of limitations as Plaintiffs themselves asserted, they breached the 
terms of the April 1994 Letter Agreement in mid-1995 but did not file any suit until June 
2007. See supra at 4. See also fn. 4. 
· Plaintiffs also assert that the Court failed to consider Utah Code Annotated 
Section 788-2-1048 in its consideration of Plaintiffs' fraud claim against Mr. Brown. 
Although Plaintiffs specifically cite Section 788-2-104 in its Motion, following 
Defendants' Opposition, Plaintiffs, in their Reply, assert that the pre-2008 amended 
version, Section 78-12-359 is applicable. The Court finds that under either version 
Plaintiffs' claim that Mr. Brown's out-of-state resident status tolls the statute limitations 
fails . 
. In signing the April 29, 1994, Letter Agreement and Guarantee and Waiver, Mr. 
Brown consented to resolve all matters in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Third Judicial 
8States: 
If a cause of action accrues against a person while the person is out of the state 
and the person is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state in accordance 
with Section 78B-3-205; the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this 
chapter after his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues the person departs 
from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action unless Section 788-3-205 applies. 
(emphasis added). 
9States: 
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state, 
the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after his return to 
the state. If after a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the time of his 
absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. 
6 
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (Defs.1 Opp. To Pis.' Mot. For Part. 
Summ. J. and Mem. In Supp. of Defs.' Counter Mot. For Summ. J. Exs. A at ,I12, Bat 
11 i). Neither party disputes the validity of the noted forum selection clauses. 
In instances in which there is an enforceable forum selection clause, "[only] a 
'rational nexus' between Utah and the underlying dispute [must be shown]. This nexus 
need not meet the more rigorous minimum contacts standard utilized in those cases 
where a forum selection clause is not present." Jacobsen Const. Co .• Inc. v. Teton 
Builders, 2005 UT 4, ,I32, 106 P.3d 719 (citing Phone Directories Co., Inc. v. 
Henderson, 2000 UT 64, ,r 1410, 8 .P.3d 256). 
Accordingly, this Court concludes that the forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction 
clause in the parties' contract, specifying Utah as the appropriate jurisdiction to resolve 
claims under the contract, creates a rebuttable presumption that the trial court has 
personal jurisdiction over Mr. Brown. See Jacobsen Const. Co., 2005 UT at ,r 39 
(holding that "forum selection clauses need not make specific mention of a consent to 
jurisdiction when the language of the clause makes the parties' intention to resolve 
disputes in a particular forum evident.") See also Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726 
(Utah Ct.App.1990) (stating that '1defects in personal jurisdiction can be waived" 
(citation omitted)). The Court also finds that the record before it establishes the 
10Explaining: 
In particular, we hold that, while a forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause by itself is 
not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant as a matter of law, such 
clauses do create a presumption in favor of jurisdiction and will be upheld as fair and 
reasonable so long as there is a rational nexus between the forum selected and/or 
consented to, and either the parties to the contract or the transactions that are the subject 
matter of the contract. Although the rational nexus element does require some connection 
between Utah and either the parties to or the actions contemplated by the contract, it 
need not rise to the level required under section [78B-3-205]. 
1 
necessary rational nexus 11: (1) At the time of contracting, Plaintiff, Majestic was a Utah 
corporation, with its business headquarters in Salt Lake County, (Compl.1f 2); (2) At the 
time of contracting, Defendant, Mr. Brown was a resident of Salt Lake County, Id. at ,r 
3; (3) Defendant, Sentry is a Utah corporation, with its business headquarters in Salt 
Lake County, Id. at 1J 4; {4) Defendant, SFC is a Utah corporation, with its business 
headquarters in Salt Lake County, Id. at 1J 5; and, (5) In or about March 1995, Majestic 
· was in default on the terms of agreement it had with Sentry, both Utah corporations. Id. 
at 1f 19. 
In regards to Section 78-12-35, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have misconstrued 
the statutory language and therefore, the purpose of the provision. 
First, Section 78-12-35, specifically addresses the tolling of time for the 
commencement of an action. It clearly states: 
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the 
state, the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this 
chapter after his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he 
departs from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time 
limited for the commencement of the action. 
(2007)(emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court explained "that the objective of ... 
[78-12-35] was to prevent a defendant from depriving a plaintiff of the opportunity of 
suing him by absenting himself from the state during the period of limitation." Snyder v. 
Clune, 390 P .2d 915, 916 (Utah 1964 ). Highlighting the purpose of the statute at issue, 
in the matter of Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, 158 P.3d 532, the court held that 
11Explaining that the rational nexus "operates as a safety valve, providing a mechanism whereby 
Utah courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction when Utah has no real interest in the outcome of a given 
dispute." Id. at ,r 41. 
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because defendant was an out-of-state defendant whom plaintiff was unable to locate 
at the time she attempted to serve her second amended complaint, which then was 
outside of the applicable statute of limitations, the statute of limitations was tolled. Id. at 
1f112-7 (holding "section 78-12-35 ... does toll the applicable statute of limitations 
when a person against_whom a claim has accrued has left the state of Utah and has no 
agent within the state upon whom service of process can be made, even where the 
person was at all times amenable to service pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute." 
(emphasis added)). 
Unlike the matter in Olseth, Plaintiffs knew that "[in] the mid-1990s Mr. Brown 
relocated his permanent residence ... to Teton County, Wyoming, where he has 
continuously maintained his permanent legal residence and domicile." (Gillett Aff. at ,i 
3). Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on September 29, 2008, (Compl.) and served Mr. 
Brown in Wyoming. (Pis.' Reply 2). Plaintiffs have never claimed that they were unable 
to locate Mr. Brown in order to appropriately serve him or, that Mr. Brown's absence 
from Utah deprived them of their ability to timely commence the entitled matter. 
Compare Olseth, 2007 UT at fflf 3-7. Plaintiffs solely argue that they were required to 
serve Mr. Brown in Wyoming and that there was an extended period of time in 
attempting to take Mr. Brown's deposition. (Pis.' Reply at 2-3). The fact that Mr. Brown 
was served in Wyoming and the alleged inconvenience of Plaintiffs in attempting to 
timely depose Mr. Brown does not invoke Section 78-12-35 and therefore, does not toll 
the statute of limitations of Plaintiffs' breach of contract and fraud claims. See Tracey 
v. Blood, 3 P.2d 263, 266 (Utah 1931) ("Apparently all courts are agreed .. that the 
burden was upon the plaintiff to plead and prove facts sufficient to toll the statute of 
9 
limitations[.]")). 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs' Rule 59(b) and 60(b) Motion is DENIED. 
2 Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants' Prepared Judgment 
The Court finds that Defendants' proposed Order- submitted March 19, 2014, 
and entered by this Court on April 13, 2014, as the Order of the Court - is consistent 
with the Court's ruling on December 16, 2013. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs' "objections" are merely a veiled attempt to take a second 
bite at the apple and are therefore, OVERRULED. 
Accordingly, the Order entered April 13, 2014, is HEREBY AFFIRMED. 
This Ruling stands as the Order of the Court. No further order is required. 
Dated this 24th day of June, 2014. 
BY THE COURT: 
10 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling dated this :.J 5' 
day of June, 2014, was issued via either electronic or standard mail to the following: 
Christopher M. Ault 
Zachary W. Powell 
THE AULT FIRM, PC 
8817 South Redwood Road, Suite A 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
Stephen G. Homer 
2877 West 9150 South 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
CLERK OF COURT 
ll 
ADDENDUMD 
UTAH CODE§ 78B-2-104 
78B-2-104. Effect of absence from state. 
If a cause of action accrues against a person while the person is out of the state 
and the person is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state in 
accordance with Section 78B-3-205, the action may be commenced within the 
term as limited by this chapter after his return to the state. If after a cause of 
action accrues the person departs from the state, the time of his absence is not 
part of the time limited for the commencement of the action unless Section 78B-3-
205 applies. 
Utah Code. Ann.§ 78B-2-104 (2009) 
ADDENDUME 
UTAH CODE§ 78B-2-305 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
I 
I 
78B-2-305. Within three years. 
An action may be brought within three years: 
(1) for waste, trespass upon, or injury to real property; except that when waste 
or trespass is committed by means of underground works upon any mining 
claim, the cause of action does not accrue until the discovery by the 
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the waste or trespass; 
(2) for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions for 
specific recovery; except that in cases where the subject of the action is a 
domestic animal usually included in the term "livestock," which at the time 
of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if the animal strayed or was stolen 
from the true owner without the owner's fa ult, the cause does not accrue 
until the owner has actual knowledge of facts that would put a reasonable 
person upon inquiry as to the possession of the animal by the defendant; 
(3) for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of action 
does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting the fraud or mistake; 
(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or 
forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where in special cases a 
different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state; or 
(5) to enforce liability imposed by Section 78B-3-603, or for damages under 
Section 78B-6-1701, except that the cause of action does not accrue until the 
aggrieved party knows or reasonably should know of the harm suffered. 
Utah Code. Ann. § 78B-2-305 (2010). 
• 
• 
• 
• 
ADDENDUMF 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 56 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 21 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary 
judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
( c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages. 
( d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief 
is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this · 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file 
such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party1s opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to 
this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court 
shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be 
adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (2014). 
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ADDENDUMG 
LETTER AGREEMENT 
(R.299-302) 
( 
s FCC, I ~JSi!:!:!. !IN~~flt~i}~~~r.?i~TION 
Telephone; (801) 596--9600 Telefax (801) 596-9630 
ORIG!t~AL 
.Jonathan M. Rugs 
as of April 29, 1994 
HAND-DELIVERED 
I 
Mr. David K. Gillett. 
President 
MAJESTIC AIRLINES, INC. 
180 North 2400 West 
Salt (.ake City, UT 84116 
RE: $483,102.43 loan (·Loan·) made by Sentry Financial Corporation ("'Sentry~) to 
Majestic Airlines, Inc. (·MA1•1 
Oear1Dave, 
This letter agreement replaces and supersedes the Commitment Letter and Amendment each dated 
April 29, 1994 among Sentry, MAI, Boyd J. Brown i-Brown") and David K. Gillett (•Gillett•). Sentry, 
MAI; Brown, Gillett and Majestic Holding, Inc. t·MHr) {collectively the ·Parties") agree as follows: 
1. Sentry will pay the sum of $454,021.99 to Textron Financial Corporation ("TFC"l and 
TFC will assign all of TFC's right, title and interest in and to (al four (4) Promissory 
Notes issued by MAI payable to TFC each dated December 15, 1992 in the following 
original principal amounts $116,814.28 (s/n U-33, N433SA), $116,814.28 (s/n U-35, 
N336PL), $133,596.83 (s/n U-88, N7899R), and $133,596.83 (s/n U-94, N9FH) 
(collectively the "Notes"); (bl Aircraft Security Agreement dated July 30, 1994 
1·Textron Security Agreement•) between MAI and TFC; (c) Guaranty dated July 30, 
1994 rParent Guaranty•) of Majestic Holding Inc. to TFC; and (dl Guaranty dated July 
30, 1994 ("Guaranty") of David K. Gillett to TFC. The Notes, the Textron Security 
Agreement, the Guaranty the Parent Guaranty all other documents and agreements 
related thereto shall hereinafter collectively be referred to as the "Loan Documents". 
The four Beechcrart BE-99 aircraft, bearing FAA registration numbers N7899R, NSFH, 
N336PL and N433SA and serial numbers U-88, U-94, U-35 and U-33 shall collectively 
with all related equipment be referred to as the "Aircraft". 
2. MAI and Gillett represent and warrant to Sentry that: (al anached hereto as Exhibit B 
are true and correct copies of the loan Documents; (bl the Loan Documents constitute 
all of the documents relating to MAi's financing with TFC; le) the Loan Documents are 
valid, binding and enforceable in accordance with their terms; and (di t.he Loan 
Documents create a valid, first priority security interest in favor of Sentry in four 
Beechcraft BE-99 aircraft, bearing FAA registration numbers N7899R, N9FH, N336PL 
and N433SA and serial numbers U-88, U-94, U-35 and U-33 (collectively with all 
related equipment the "Equipmeni-). 
3. MAI will execute and deliver a Security Agreement (" Additional Security Agreement") 
in a form acceptable to Sentry granting Sentry a security interest in additional collateral 
described therein as further security for the Loan. 
4. Brown, Gillett and MHI will each execute and deliver a Guarantee and Waiver (in a form 
acceptable to Sentry) of all of MAi's obligations to Sentry under the Loan Documents, 
this Agreement, the Additional Security Agreement and all documents contemplated 
thereby or hereby (collectively the "Sentry Loan Documents"). In consideration for 
Dallas, TX 
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Mr. David K. Gillett 
as of April 29, 1994 
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I 
Brown executing and delivering the Guarantee and Waiver, MAI will pay Brown a fee 
of $20,000. 
5. In consideration of Sentry agreeing to purchase the TFC Loan Documents from TFC, 
MAI shall pay to Sentry Ion or before May 31, 1994) a loan origination fee of 
$9,080.44. MAI, Gillett, Brown and MHI have requested and Sentry has agreed to 
fund the loan origination fee and the guarantee fee to Brown by increasing the amount 
of the Loan by $29,080.44 to $483,102.43. 
6. The repayment terms of the Loan Documents shall be changed as follows: la) the 
outstanding principal amount of the Loan shall be increased to $483,102.43; Cb) MAI 
shall repay the Loan in advance. in 36 equal monthly payments of $15,779.57 (each 
a•Monthly Payment"), payable on the first day of each month commencing on July 1, 
1994 and continuing through June 1, 1997; and Cc) MAI shall make an interim payment 
(due on or before July 1, 19941 of $30,654.66 for the period from the date hereof 
through June 30, 1994. 
7. In the event the Aircraft or any one them is destroyed, damaged beyond repair, lost, 
stolen, or taken by government action for an indefinite period or for a stated period 
extending beyond June 30, 1997 (each an "Event of Loss"), MAI must promptly notify 
Sentry and pay to Sentry, as the case may be, on the date the Monthly Payment is due 
and payable following the Event of Loss, an amount equal to the Casualty Value set 
forth in Exhibit A. If the Event of Loss _is in respect of some but not all of the Aircraft, 
the amount of the payment to Sentry shall be a fraction of the Casualty Value, the 
numerator of which is the original principal amount of the Notets) by TFC issued in 
respect of such destroyed or lost Aircraft and the denominator of which is 
$500,822.22. 
8. MAI shall have the right to prepay the Loan at any time upon thirty days wrinen notice 
to Sentry. In the event the Loan has not been repaid in full on or before October 1, 
1994 the Monthly Payment shall be increased to $ 16,430.33. In the event the Loan 
has not been repaid in full on or before January 1, 1995 the Monthly Payment shall be 
increased to $17,201.20. 
9. All payments made by MAI to Sentry shall be made at 201 S. Main Street, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84111-2115, unless notified·of a change in writing by Sentry. 
10. In the event of a breach by MAI, Gillen or Boyd of any of the terms or conditions of the 
Sentry Loan Documents, MAI, Gillett and Boyd jointly and severally agree to pay all of 
Sentry's costs and expenses incurred in connection with the breach and/or the 
enforcement of any of the Sentry Loan Documents including, without limitation, 
reasonable attorneys' fees. 
11. For the avoidance of doubt, the Textron Security Agreement shall secure all of MAi's 
obligations hereunder. 
12. Anything to the contrary notwithstanding, this agreement and all other Sentry Loan 
117:sll.A- I.MAI 
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Documents shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the 
State of Utah (without giving effect to principles relating to conflicts of laws). The 
Parties hereby consent to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tt)ird Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah c•court•), for a determination of any,dispute as to 
any matters hereunder and authorizes service of process by the Court for a determina-
tion of any dispute as to any such matters by service of process on the Parties by 
certified or registered mail sent to Lessee at the address referred to _in Section 19 lb) 
above. If the Third Judicial District Court set forth above does not have jurisdiction to 
hear and decide the matter before it, the Parties consent to the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Federal District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division; provided, 
however, that nothing herein shall preclude Sentry if it thinks fit, from instituting 
proceedings against any or all of the Parties in any country or place which may have 
jurisdiction for the purpose of protecting and enforcing Sentry's rights either hereunder 
or under any other Sentry Loan Agreements, documents, 1 instruments or otherwise. 
Sincerely, 
rJ=.7n.Ko/ 
/ thief Executive Officer 
Accepted and Agreed to as of 
this ~9th day of April, 1994. ~ MAJESTIC AIRLINES, INC. By.-~#9W 
Name: David K. Gillett 
Title: President 
MAJESTIC HOLDING, INC. 
By:~tlar 
Name: David K. Gillen 
Title: I President 
i 
I 
David K. Gillett, pers nally 
... 
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CASUAL TY VALUES 
EXHIBIT A 
C 
to LETTER AGREEMENT dated as of April 29, 1994 
among 
SENTRY FINANCIAL CORPORATION, MAI, BOYD BROWN, and DAVID K. GILLETT 
The Casualty Value of the Aircraft is the percentage of $483,102.43 set forth opposite 
the applicable loan payment · 
AFTER AFTER 
LOAN PAYMENT CASUALTY LOAN PAYMENT CASUALTY 
NUMBER VALUE NUMBER VALUE 
---------- --------- ---------- ---------
1 100.00% 19 57.78% 
2 97.65% 20 55.56°/4 
3 95.29% 21 53.33% 
4 92.94% 22 51.11% 
5 90.59% 23 48.89"/4 
6 88.24% 24 46.67% 
7 85.88% 25 44.44% 
8 83.53% 26 42.22% 
9 81.18% 27 40.000A. 
10 78.82% 28 37.78% 
11 76.47% 29 35.56% 
12 74.12% 30 33.33% 
13 71.76% 31 31.11% 
14 69.41% 32 26.89% 
15 67.06°/4 33 26.67% 
16 64.71% 34 24.44% 
17 62.35% 35 22.22% 
18 60.000A. 36 20.00% 
... 
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ADDENDUMH 
BROWN GUARANTY AND WAIVER 
(R.304-06) 
I 
• 
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GUARANTEE AND WAIVER 
of $483, 102..43 Loon 
mado by SENTRY FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
a Utah col'l)Orotion, to 
MAJESTIC AIRLINES, INC., 111 Ulah corporation 
&ckground 
Sontry RMncial Corporation, 111 Utah corporation. rsontry"I, modo o loan in tho amount of t483, 102.43 to Majestic Airiinos, 
lnc •• 11 Utoh corpor11tion ("MAI") o'olidoncod by four 141 Promi1111ory Notos iesuod by MAI poyllblo to Toxtron fillllncilll Corporation 
rTFC"I 011ch dated Oocombor 15, 1992 in tho following original principal 1111'1\0Unta $116,814.28 a/n U-33, N433SA), 
$1 t 6,814.28 (a{n lJ.35, N336PU, $133,596.83 (sin U-88, N7899RI, end $133,596.83' 111/n U•94, N9FHI (colloctivoly tho 
"Notos"J. Tho Notes woro aocurod by an Aircraft Security Agroomont dstod July 30, 1994 C-Security Agroomont"I botwoon 
MA1 1and TFC. Th<, Notos, tho Security Agroomont ond 1111 rolatod documents ("TFC Loan Documonts") wore aalligned to Sentry 
by TFC puraucmt to an A.isignmont dotod as of May 2. 1994 r Aasignmont•). Tho TFC Loan Documants woro modifiod by a 
lonot agroomont d11tod as of April 29. 1994 C-Lottor Agroomont•J among MAI. Sentry, Boyd J. Brown [•Brown•) and Dovid K. 
Gillett ("Gillott"J. Tho TfC Locn Documonts as nsignod to Sentry pursuant to tho Assignment and moditiod by tho Lonur 
Agroomont ahl!ll! horoinaftor bo rofo,rod to as tho rLoan Documonts"I. 
(al In order to induco Sentry to maka 1ho Loon and ontor into the Loan Documonts to which it is a parry, and to 
othor.wiso oxtond credit or financial oecommodationa to MAI {"Obligor"I. ond for other QOod ond vllluoblo considorotion, tho 
rocaipt. odoquacy, ond logo! aufficial'ICy of which oro horaby 11clmowlodgod. tho undorsignod (tho ~Guarantor") horoby irrevocably 
and ~nconditionally guarantoos end promiuos to and for Iha banofil of Sentry, Its auccos11ors and assigns, poymont ond 
por1ormanco whon duo, whothor by oecoforotion or othorwi11a, of ·any ond oil Uebllitios of th<, Obligor to Sontry arising from or 
in connoction with tho loon Documents. Tho tonn "Uabilitios of tho Obligor· is usod horoin in its most comprohonsivo sonse 
end shell indudo, but is not limitod to. oll lillbilitios, debts and obligations, voluntary or involuntary, diroct or Indirect, absolute 
01 coiltingent, joint, sovoral or indopondont, of the Obligor. now or horooftor oxisting, duo or to bocoms due, whothar c1osted 
dirocdy or acquired by ossignmont or othorwiso, arising from 01 in connection with tho Loon Documonts, whothor such 
indobtodnoss moy bo or ha1oohor bocomo barred by ony 11t11tuto of limitations or whothor such indobtodnoss may be or horoaftor 
bocomc othorwiso unonlorcosblo. This is II continuing guaranty relating to all indobtodnoss of tho Obligor to Sentry, including 
that o~sing under succossivo Equipment Schodul0$ and loaso ond/or loon uanssctions. In addition, tho Guarantor agroos to 
indorrinily, hold harmless and dofond Sentry against any loss, domago, or liability boceuso of any wrongful acts or fraud of tho 
Obligor arising lrom or in coMOC'lion with tho loan Documents. 
(bl· Tho Guarantor l)oroby wnivos notico of occoptanca of this Guarontoo and Waivor ond notico of ony liability to which it 
may apply, ond waivos diligonco, prosontmont. damood for poymont arid porformanco, protest, notico of dishonor or nonpayment 
of any1such liabilitios or nonporformenco. suit or taking of other oction by Sonny against. and any othor notice to, any party liable 
thoroon (including tho Obligo1 and Guarontorl and woivos ony dolanso, otfsot, rocoupmonl, reduction, or countorclaim for or on 
account of 11ny roason or avant whatovor to 11ny li8bility of tho Guoron1or haroundor. Sentry moy 01 ony timo end from limo to 
limo (whothor or not 11hor revocation or tonnination of this Guarantoo and Waivol) without tho consent of, or notice to the 
Guare~tor, without incurring responsibility to tho Guarantor, without impairing or rolaasing, in ony manner whatsoovor, the 
obliostions of tho Guarantor horoundor, upon or without any terms or conditions and in whole or in pan: 11) ranew, modify, 
amand, compromiso. oxtond. occolorato, disch!lfgo or othorwieo change trni manner, placo, or torms.of paymont and/or change 
or axte'nd the time of paymcmt of, renew or Bltor, any and all Usbilitios of the Obligor, any socurity tharcfor, or any liability 
incurre~ directly or indirectly in 1ospoct thoraof, and tho guorantoo heroin mado shall apply to tho Uebilitios of tho Obligor as so 
changed, olCtondad, ronowod or ohorod; (2) soU, oxchango, rolaoso. surrondar, roalizo upon or othorwiao doal with in any manner 
ond in liny ardor any proporty by whomsoovor at any tima plodgod or mongagod to secure, or howsoovar socuring tho Liabilities 
of 1ha Obligor horoby guer11ntoad or ony liebilitios !including any of thoso haraundorl incurred diroctly or indirocdy in rospoct 
thorootlor horoof, 11nd/or offsat thoreagainst; 13) oxorciso or rolrain lrom 11xorcising any rights against tho Obligor or othors 
!including tho Guarontorl or othorwiso oct or rolrain from octing; 141 10ttlo or compromiao any Uabili'lios of tho Obligor horaby 
guarontoad, ony security !horofor, or any liahility (including any of thouo horaundorl incurrod directly or indiroctly in rospoct 
thorool or hereof. and mey subordin11to tho payment of all or ony p11rt thoroof to tho poymont ot 11ny liability (whothor duo or 
natl ol tho Obligor to croditor11 of tho Obligor other than Sontry ond tho undorsignod; and (SI apply any IUms by whomso11ver 
pajd or ~owsoovor roalizod lo any ond all Liabilitioo of tho Obligor to Sentry rogordlaGS of what liability or Uabilitioa of tho Obligor 
remain inpoid. 
(cl No inval"ldity, irrogularity or unonforcoooility of all 01 any part of tho Uobililioe of Obligor haroby guorantaod or ol any 
aocuri1yjthorofor shall elfoct, impnir, or ba o dolons:o to thiu Guor0t1tao and Waivor. Thi, liability of tho Guarantor horaundcr is 
pri~ry fnd unconditional and shall not bo aubjoct 10 ony olfsot, doforuso, or counterclaim of tho Obligor, Thia GuarontH and 
.,. 
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Wiiivor i11 ,. continuing ono ond o11 liabilitlee to which it applloe or moy apply undor tho tollll& horoof chell be conclusivoly 
prosumod to how boon crootod in rolionco horoof. TilO boob ond rocOf'd• of Sentry oholl bo odminiblo as prime focia ovidonco 
of tho Liobilitios of tho Obligor. A• to tho Guorantor, 1fn Guorontoo and w,-ver •twill contiouo until wrinon notioo of rovoeotion 
11igpod by tho Guarantor shml hovo boon ectulllly rocoivod by Sontry, nowrithstonding a r<tVOOalioo by, or oomploto or partial 
rol~at10 for eny oouoo of, oithor tho Guwantor or tho Obligor, or of any ono liablo in MY monnor for tho Uobilitioe of tho Obligor 
horoby guorontood, or for tho liabi!ilin lincludino thoso heroin) incurred diroctty or indirectly in rospoct thoroof or horoof, 11nd 
no~withstanding tho dissolution, termination, or incroaso, decroaao, or change In poraonnol of any ono or moro of tho undoraignod 
which moy bo partnol'llhipo or oorponsliOM. 
I 
tdl No rovocotion or torminotion horoof ahell affect in any monnor ony right& l:lrising undor thia Guarrmtoo ond Wcivor with 
roaP.act to (1) liobilitioe which 11hall have boon croatod, contlocted, u!IUfflod, or lncunod prior to recoipt by Sentry of wrinon 
notice of ouch rovocotion or termination,. « (21 liobililios which ahaU have boon crutod, oontractod, usumod, or lncurtod oftor 
rocJ.pt of 11uch written notice purauom to any ee>nUIICt antorod Into by Sontry prior to roooipt of such notice; end tho solo offoct 
of rovocotion or torminotion horoof •hdl bt to oxdudo from thio Guorantoo and Wflivor liebllitioe tt-oaftor milling wNch ore 
unconnoctod with liobilitios thorotoforo orisino or troni11,cdon,, thorotoforo entered Into. 
! ·. . 
iol If, within ton (10) dovs oftor tho doto of tho happoning of 11ny default of Obligor undor tho Loon Dooumonto, Guuontor 
has not fully curod tho auch dafoult. than et any timo tharollftor, Sentry moy, without notice to tho Obliger, but with written 
notice to tho Guorontor, mo.ko tho liabilitio• of tho Obligor to Sentry, whothor or not thon duo, imrnodiatoly duo and poyablo 
horobndor os to tho Guarantor, ond Sentry 11hall bo ontidod 10 enforce tho obliQlltions of tho Guarantor horoundor. In addition, 
upo~ tho happening of any of tho following ovonts: tho insolvency or s1.11;ponsion of businoes of tho Guarantor qr tho issuonco 
of any worront or ottochmont against any of tho proporty of tho Guarantor (and any such worrunt or attachmont is not di&ehargod 
within twenty (20) days), or tho making by tho undorsignod of ony 011signmont for tho bonefit of croditors, or a trusto:o or receiver 
being appointod for tho Guaronlor or for any of it& proporty tend 11uch appointment ia not tonninatod in favor of tho Guorantor 
within twenty (201 days), or any procooding being commenced by or agflinst tho Guarantor under any bankruptcy, roorganizetion, 
orrongemont of dobt. insolvency, roodjulltl'nOnt of debt. rocoivor11hlp, liquidotion or dissolution law or· stetuto (end such 
proc~oding is not dismlesod within twenty (201 doyol - than end in any such ovent. ond st any time thoroaftor. Sontry may, 
withdut nodco to tho Obliger, but with writton nolico to tho Guarantor, molc;o tho Liabilities of tho Obligor to Sontry whothor or 
not thon duo, immodiatoly duo and poyoblo horoundor as to tho Guorantor, and Sontry shall be 11ntillod to onlorco tho obligations 
of tho, Guarantor horoundor. Any and bll dllims of any naturo which tho Guarontor may now or horooftor havo agwnst tho Obliger 
oro horoby subordinated to the fuU paymont to Sontry of tho Uobilitios of tho Obliger ond aro horoby assigned 10 Sontry as 
PClditibnal collator at security therefor. 
(fl In tho ovonl Sentry rotains an onomoy (whothor io-houso or othorwisol for tho purposo of oHocting colloction of tho 
Liabilities of the Obliger or of tho Guoiontor hereunder, tho Guarantor i;;hllll pay 1111 costs 11nd oxponsos of ovory kind for 
colloc6on, including roaaom,blo 11ttomoys' foos. 
(gl, If claim is ovor made upon Sentry for repavn,ont or rocovory of any omount or amounts rocoived bv Sentry in pe','fflont 
or on account of ony of tho Liabilities of tho Obligor and Sentry ropoys ell or pert of said emount by rooson of (1) an·, judgment, 
docroo~ or ordor of any court or odmlnistrotivo body hoving jurisdiction ovnr Sentry or any of its proporty, or (2) any i;;ottlemant 
or compromise of any euch deim offoctod by Sontry with any such claimant (including tho Obligor), then snd in such event the 
Guarentor ogroos thot any euch judgment. docr1>0, ordl>f, 11ottlomanl, or compromise shall bo binding upon t~ Guarantor, 
notwithstanding ony rovocotion hereof or th<11'concollotion of ony note or othor instrument ovidoncing any liability of tho Obliger, 
ond th~ Guarantor shall be end remain fieblo to Sentry horoundor for tho amount 110 repaid or recov11rod to tho GIima oxtont es 
ii such amount had nova, originolly boon rocoivod by Sentry. 
I 
lhl No dol11y on tho part of Sentry in exorcising any of its options, powors 01 rights, or partial or singlo oxorciso thoroof, shall 
constituto a woivor thereof. No woivor of any of its right& horoundor. end no modification or amondmont of this Guarontoo and 
Weivor.;shall bo doomed to be modo by Sontry unless tho samo shall bo in writing, duly signed on behalf of Sentry, and each 
such wf.vor, if 11ny, shell opply only with rospoct to tho upocific instenco involved, and aholl in no way impair tho rights of Sontry 
or the obligations of tho Guorontor to Sontry in any other respect ol ony other time. Tho Guarantor shall hovo no right of 
subrogation against tho Obliger or any aocurity hold for eny Liobilitios ol tho Obligor until Sontry shell have boon paid in lull all 
Uabililio~ of tho Obligor, in which caso Sontry will nsign ond subrogato llll of its right, titlo ond intorost in end to tho Loan 
Oocumo~ts. 
lil T~s Guorentoo and Weivor and tho rights and obligations of Sentry and of tho Gu11r11ntoc horoundor ehall bo govornod 
and construod in accordenco with tho lawa of tho State ol Utah: 11nd this Guarontoo and Wai.vor is binding upon tho Guorontor, 
il.11 succo~sors ond assigns, 11nd •hall inuro to tho benefit ol Sentry, its auccoasora ond assigns. Tho undorsignod horoby conoanla 
to tho oi<cluaivo jurisdiction of tho Third Judiciol Di•trict Coun for Solt I..Dko County, Stato of µteh (tho •eour1•1, for 11 
dolormination of any diaputo as to ony f!Mltton horoundor and outhorixo11 aorvico of prooo11t by tho Court for o dotorminGtion of 
CM'ly disp(lto 1111 to any •uch mattol'll by lffrvioo of procos, on tho Guarantor by conlliod or rogisterod moil aont 10 tho Gu.arantor 
ot tho addreu of tho Guorontor HI forth below. The Guorontoo ond WOAvor moy bo assigned, tranuforrod end not over by Sontry 
·•· 
... 
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to ony other pol'llon, finn or corporation without tho consont of tho Guarantor and, upon notico in writing mado by Sontry's 
••llipnoo or uensforoo of st1ch iissignmont of thi11 Guarantoo and Waiver, all of tho right111 Dtld' romodioe of Sentry and tho liabilities 
of dWl Guarantor horoundor aholl inuro to tho ullO CIOd benefit of such aallignoo or troneforoo ond the liabilitios of tho Guarantor 
hor~ndor •hall cpply with tho ecmo tOfco Dtld' ottoct os if thi11 Guarantoo and Wmvor hod originolly boon oxo~od and dolivorod 
by tho Gunrantor dirocdy to euch usignoo Dtld' transloroo. 
IJ1 Thia Guarontoo end Wri,,vor and tho righta and oblioatioos of Sentry Dnd tho Guorentor haroundor 11hall remain in tull forco 
and oftoct until tho Obligor hall 11oti,fiod In tull oil of tho obligation, and UcbilitiH of tho Obligor undor tho Loan Docvmonts. 
ci11tod as ot April 29, 1994 
' 
I 
STATE OF UTAH 
: as. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
: (~ 
On this }J: day ot May, 1994, porsonally appoorod boforo mo, BOYD J. BROWN who, boiog by r1'H:I duly sworn. did say th111 
ho is tho signor of tho cibovo G rontoo nnd Wriivor who, upon boing by mo duly sworn, duly ocknowlodgod to mo that he 
oxo<::\.ltod the o,imo and hat 111otomonts contni heroin ond thoroin oro tn.Jo. 
... 
. .. 
I 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
MARCO 8. KUNZ 
201 So. Main #1400 
S.LC., UT 8411 t 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
JAN. 10, l998 
STATE or UTAH 
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ADDENDUMI 
MUTUAL RELEASE 
(R.317) 
• 
I 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Thii> t..11111.:il Rnlr.aso !s nntmm1 into this 'In- day cf /) ,-:,: r' ,YI Q~C , 19 'if•, bv 
and IJotwour. Sentry Financial Corporation l"Se:ntry"l, a Urah Corporntion, and David K. Gill9U, 
l''Giilott"), an indlvidual. 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, Se11Cf',' and Gillett agreed to compromistl and settle any and all disputes among 
them arising from c1nd in connection vvirh (al th,~ loan made by Sonuy to Gillott. tho torms of which 
are set forth in a IE:tter agretiment dated as of April 29, 1 ::194, {b) the subsequent foreclosure action 
by Sentry and SFC AircraH Corp. I {"SFC Aircraft") (cl the: ;>Uction of M:::jastic Airlines, Inc. 
IJfoparcy on or aoo~u October 6, I 005 by Srarman Bros. Auctions. Inc., ldl the sale or othor 
disposition of property on which Samry or SF'C Aircraf1 holds a lien and lei any other rransaclion 
relared to or caf!nected with the above-referenced t1,ll\sactions. 
NOW, THEREFORE, for the considerarion ht:reinaf:er set forth and thtl mutual promises and 
covenants containad herein and ache.- good ant.I vaiuable ~onslderarion. tlle sufliciancy of which is 
horuby :icknowlodgod, IT :s HEREBY AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 
I. Si;ntq, and GilhJtt mutuc11!y r1.tlt1as0r:, forever discharg1: end agree to hold harmless o..ich othor, 
.ind anv an<f all of ,hair .illied or related companies. emplo•;ues. partners. agents. officors, directors. 
sh;.;rehold1m;, n.presem~ti .es and all othar alih.id o, related persons, ::ind Bo\•d Brown, an individual, 
fro,·n ;uw and all cl.)ims . ..:cmt1r1<1:s. c;:unagos. actions. counts. causes of action, or suits at law of 
whatev~r kind Jnd ,wwru, ond from all costs and attorneys' fees accruing and to accrue to each 
llth~r on accou11t of ,mv ;;i~id 011 known and unknown lossns or damages directly or Indirectly related 
to tho facts or transactions set forth b%,1:w•Ji,pq'f;IClt. above. 
2. A condition preced,mt to 1fie release of (iillett by Sa11try is that Gillett tum over to Sentry ot to 
sucll oerson or person$ v$ S~ntry shall autl\orite 10 accept propony an b1thillf of Sflntry RII propP.rty 
thac ;~ ovmed or !leld ()$ CCJll.itoral by s,wtry anl.l or SFC Aircraft, inr:lmiirio wilhnur limir;irlon al! 
.ii,craft. aircrnft loo::iooks and c..thi!r recl·,rds. aircraft pans and e~uipmi:,nt, ci;:iims and cause& of 
<lcuw J;Jainst insuranc& companies. lrE:ighr carrio1s and other 1>arrie, relatinu 10 aircraft anti airr.r:ifr 
p.;rts und oc;uipmeflt hhe "Prooerty") that is hoid b•1 Gille1 r. Majesr,c Airline:\, lnr.., nrhAr rnlRtP<i 
ontitios owned or comrolled by Gillett, and other amities nrlt related to Gillon but 10 which Gillert o, 
Jn on1i1y conuolled by Gillete hth'o 1;1ivan µo;)::H1~:.ion of lht! frop~ri,. 
3. Th;s: Aoreom,mt ~ha!! i.>e bindin1, on 3nd sholl il\ura to tho bunolit of the ponies hcroto end 
th(l,, rospective succ:essor;S an(I ,1:.:iiiJll:!.. 
S(NT~Y r:1N.ll,."JCIAL CORPOR/'. l'ION 
av· rJ ;');\./&I~ .... n1. ~ 
l'iumo: Jiot1aman M. H•iQa I - -
Title: ..lf.fO.,_. ___________ _ 
001.149 
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